MA – L2 – Q63 – Transfer pricing

(A) Keta Shelving Limited, a company operating near Mount Adaklu, has two operating divisions, X and Y, that are treated as profit centres for the purpose of performance reporting.
Division X makes two products, Product A and Product B. Product A is sold to external customers for GH₵62 per unit. Product B is a part-finished item that is sold only to Division Y.
Division Y can obtain the part-finished item from either Division X or from an external supplier. The external supplier charges a price of GH₵55 per unit.
The production capacity of Division X is measured in total units of output, Products A and B. Each unit requires the same direct labour time. The costs of production in Division X are as follows:

 

Product A Product B
GH₵ GH₵
Variable cost 46 48
Fixed cost 19 19
Full cost 65 67

Required:
(a) What is an optimal transfer price?

(b) What would be the optimal transfer price for Product B if there is spare production capacity in Division X?

(c) What would be the optimal transfer price for Product B if Division X is operating at full capacity due to a limited availability of direct labour, and there is unsatisfied external demand for Product A?

(a) An optimal transfer price (or range of transfer prices) is a price for an internally-transferred item at which:

  • the selling division will want to sell units to the other profit centre, because this will add to its divisional profit
  • the buying division will want to buy units from the other profit centre, because this will add to its divisional profit
  • the internal transfer will be in the best interests of the entity as a whole, because it will help to maximise its total profit.

    (b) When Division X has spare capacity, its only cost in making and selling extra units of Product B is the variable cost per unit of production, GH₵48. Division Y can buy the product from an external supplier for GH₵55. It follows that a transfer price that is higher than GH₵48 but lower than GH₵55, for additional units of production, will benefit both profit centres as well as the company as a whole. (It is in the best interests of the company to make the units in Division X at a cost of GH₵48 than to buy them externally for GH₵55.

    (c) When Division X is operating at full capacity and has unsatisfied external demand for Product A, it has an opportunity cost if it makes Product B for transfer to Division Y. Product A earns a contribution of GH₵16 per unit (GH₵62 – GH₵46). The minimum transfer price that it would require for Product B is:

     

    GH₵
    Variable cost of production of Product B 48
    Opportunity cost: lost contribution from sale of Product A 16
    Minimum transfer price to satisfy Division X management 64

    Division Y can buy the product from an external supplier for GH₵55, and will not want to buy from Division X at a price of GH₵64. The maximum price it will want to pay is GH₵55.
    The company as a whole will benefit if Division X makes and sells Product A.
    It makes a contribution of GH₵16 from each unit of Product A.
    If Division X were to make and sell Product B, the company would benefit by only GH₵7. This is the difference in the cost of making the product in Division X (GH₵48) and the cost of buying it externally (GH₵55).
    The same quantity of limited resources (direct labour in Division X) is needed for each product, therefore the company benefits by GH₵9 (GH₵16 – GH₵7) from making units of Product A instead of units of Product B.
    On the basis of this information, the transfer price for Product B should be GH₵64 as long as there is unsatisfied demand for Product A. At this price, there will be no transfers of Product B.